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Abstract12
This paper presents a literature review of all quantitative (statistical) studies of compliance with 
EU law. The paper introduces and makes use of a new online database 
 
http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/implementation/  which presents a detailed and comprehensive 
overview and classification of the existing quantitative research on transposition and 
implementation of EU directives in the member states. The study discusses and compares the 
different conceptualizations and operationalizations of compliance used, the list and 
specifications of the explanatory variables included in the models, the hypotheses proposed, and, 
most importantly, the findings of the literature. While the academic field has made progress in 
terms of assessing the scale and dimensions of the transposition failures in the EU, the causal 
inferences advanced in the existing literature are often weakly supported and sometimes 
contradictory when all studies are considered. The literature review suggests that only causal 
relationships that are specific for a certain time period, policy area, country, or type of legislation 
can be supported by empirical data, which means that broad generalizations about compliance 
in the EU might be impossible to uncover. The paper also suggests that decomposing the 
implementation process into its component stages, incorporating more rigorously the 
interactions between the Commission and the member states, and paying closer attention to the 
multilevel structure of the data in the statistical models can benefit future research on 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade the academic study of the interactions between the European Union 
(EU) and the member states has flourished. The objective of this paper is to review the current 
state of the art of the quantitative (statistical) literature on compliance, transposition and 
implementation of EU law. The text is a companion paper to the online database of studies of 
implementation3, available at http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/implementation/. The database 
presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of all published articles (and some working 
papers4
The study of compliance with EU law has attracted and continues to attract considerable 
attention. Quantitative research on the topic represents only a part of the existing work in a 
field where methodological pluralism thrives and the research designs and methods employed 
range from case studies (e.g. Falkner et al., 2005, Ben, 2009, Haverland, 2000, Steunenberg, 
2007, Hartlapp, 2009), to qualitative comparative analysis (Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2009, 
Sedelmeier, 2009, Kaeding, 2008b), to nested analyses based on mixed methods (Toshkov, 
2009, Luetgert and Dannwolf, 2009, Kaeding, 2007, Mastenbroek, 2007). By focusing only on 
quantitative studies, this paper does not wish to imply that research based on other methods is 
unimportant  (for recent reviews see Mastenbroek, 2005, Treib, 2006). Due to the very 
methodological diversity and breadth of the field, however, an overview that attempts to cover 
all work will be monumental in span and ambition. A review focused exclusively on 
quantitative analyses has the advantage of having a well-defined scope. Moreover, the nature 
of statistical work allows for a more structured and detailed comparison of the various studies 
that covers the precise analytical techniques used, the list of variables included, 
conceptualizations and operationalizations, and results.  
) on the topic. The paper will necessarily focus only on a few aspects of the literature 
and will demonstrate the added value that the Implementation database offers for assessing 
the state-of-the-art in this academic subfield. 
                                            
3 The database has been developed and is managed by the author with the support of the Institute for European 
Integration Research of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. 
4 The database includes working papers in addition to the published academic articles. By doing so I hope to 
avoid the bias resulting from significant results having a higher chance of being published in journals than 
negative findings and achieve a more valid picture of the literature.   Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 6 of 44 
The sheer number of quantitative studies of compliance published over the last decade 
makes an up-to-date, comprehensive and regularly updated literature overview a worthy 
endeavor. Nowadays, scholars who take up the topic of compliance in the EU have either to 
spend a considerable amount of their research time to identify, review and compare all the 
studies, or, by sidelining some of the published work, to make uninformed choices in their 
research designs. Furthermore, the accumulation of knowledge in the field can be hampered if 
no easy access to all published work is available.   
By presenting the important aspects of the quantitative studies of compliance side by side, 
the database makes reviewing the literature easier. For example, each individual study 
presents its hypotheses and reports the results in terms of its specific dependent variable (e.g. 
transposition time, delay, or number of infringements started in a year). The database 
standardizes this information by reporting hypotheses and results in terms of a single 
outcome  –  compliance5
The current paper does not attempt to present a meta-analysis (in the strict sense of the 
term) of the quantitative literature on compliance. Of course, a formal meta-analysis would 
have been an important contribution to the academic field. Unfortunately, the studies use too 
different operationalizations of outcome variables and too different standards of presenting 
the statistical results (often not reporting sufficient information) in order to make a formal 
meta-analysis possible.  
. In addition, it enables taking stock of the current state of the 
literature and a summary of what we have learned over the last decade about the topic of 
compliance with EU law. As a consequence, the database encourages replication of existing 
analyses using different methods, operationalizations, or datasets. Using the database, one can 
also identify areas where qualitative process-tracing work might be especially useful to settle 
conflicting findings.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the fundamental 
assumptions of doing statistical research on compliance. This is followed by an overview of 
the literature structured along several dimensions. First, different operationalizations of the 
dependent variable and their pros and cons are discussed. Second, the domain of the existing 
                                            
5 Furthermore, the coding of independent variables and baseline categories of binary and categorical variables 
has been standardized. Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 7 of 44 
analyses is summarized and compared. Third, the methodological techniques used in the 
literature are reviewed. Fourth, the findings of the literature in regard to several groups of 
variables – institutions, capacity, preferences, directive features – are presented and assessed. 
The final section of the paper outlines the main conclusions of the paper and suggests some 
likely developments for the future.  
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2. COMPLIANCE WITH EU LAW AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
Sidelining issues of definition, I use both compliance and implementation in a general 
sense that covers formal transposition, practical application and enforcement of laws and 
policies (for a detailed discussion see König and Luetgert, 2009, Falkner et al., 2005, Toshkov, 
2009). Compliance with EU law as a topic of academic interest is one of those rare cases of an 
important real world problem that allows for structured empirical research due to the nature 
of the process that generates the outcomes. The practical reasons scholars have turned to 
studying compliance with EU law are obvious since non-implementation undermines the 
internal market and brings very tangible consequences for companies and citizens in Europe. 
What makes the topic even more seductive for social scientists is the fact that the process of 
implementation of EU law in the member states resembles a natural quasi-experiment where 
the input (EU legislation) is processed synchronously by a number of politico-administration 
systems. In addition, the implementation of EU directives allows for discretion in the exact 
timing, scope and manner of application. The resulting patterns of implementation outcomes 
present a window into the workings of the different national institutions and a chance to 
distill the causal effects of a multitude of factors that vary in the different countries. Finally, 
the study of compliance with EU law has burgeoned because of the wide availability of data, 
collected by European and national authorities, on the issue. These three basic rationales for 
research on compliance with EU law have to be taken into account when interpreting the 
design and findings of the literature, because certain choices that the researchers make (like 
using a complex index as a dependent variable, or studying only a few EU laws in many 
countries) make more sense if one is interested in the topic of compliance only as a setting to 
test certain causal hypotheses, rather than in the substantive dimensions and explanations of 
implementation problems. 
Altogether, more than 30 separate statistical analyses of national adaptation to EU law 
have been published in academic journals over the last decade. None of these studies, 
however, ventures into the question as to why statistical analysis of compliance is appropriate. 
The assumptions that ground the statistical approach to studying transposition and 
implementation are not spelled out. It might seem obvious that the application of statistical Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 9 of 44 
methods fits and benefits the study of domestic adaptation to EU law, but in fact several 
different rationales can be proposed, each based on different assumptions.  
First of all, the application of statistics can be justified with the aim of making descriptive 
inferences only. Measuring compliance performance is never perfect, so statistics can address 
what is essentially a measurement problem. Collecting data on a large number of cases 
improves our knowledge of the tendencies and patterns of compliance because measurement 
errors cancel out in the aggregate. Similarly, statistical techniques can be used as a data 
reduction tool, summarizing information in a compact way but still with no intention to 
support causal inferences. Different versions of factor analysis fall within this category but the 
use of regressions can also be conducted with descriptive or compact representation purposes 
only in mind.  
Secondly, apart from correcting measurement problems and summarizing complex data, 
researchers can use statistics to make causal inferences. There can be at least two, rather 
different, rationales to employ statistics for advancing causal claims. First, compliance can be 
considered an essentially stochastic (random) process which necessitates the application of 
statistical analysis. If there are no deterministic reasons for transposition delays and 
implementation failures, case studies and even small-N comparative work are unlikely to 
discover causal effects because causes are only probabilistic and increase the likelihood of an 
event without being neither necessary nor sufficient for its occurrence. If there is no causal 
chain that necessarily leads from a  set of conditions to an outcome, process tracing case 
studies will prove of little value to the scientific inquiry of compliance. But statistics can 
discover probabilistic causes that make an event more or less likely given a certain 
combination of conditions.  
Alternatively, scholars can assume that compliance performance is in principle 
deterministic although in practice there are so many possible causal factors and interactions 
between them that only statistical analysis can test for the effects in a large pool of cases. In my 
opinion, most, if not all, of the published statistical analyses of compliance are based on this 
last rationale – compliance is in principle deterministic (reasons exist for each and every 
implementation failure) but the multitude of possible causes necessitates a statistical approach Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 10 of 44 
to explanation. It is a pity that none of the articles reviewed discusses these ‘deep’ 
methodological assumptions because they reveal the fundamental understanding of 
compliance as a social process that a researcher has in mind. Even if left implicit, the 
justification for the use of quantitative analysis carries with it certain implications that limit 
the research design choices and the interpretation of the findings.  
The assumptions needed to make casual inferences from regression and related 
techniques are also left implicit in the bulk of the literature reviewed. It is useful to briefly 
review these assumptions. First, studies that aspire to estimate causal effects need to assume 
unit homogeneity  (King et al., 1994, 90)6
The second assumption for estimating causal effects is conditional independence (King et 
al., 1994, 94)
. In the context of implementation research, the 
assumption of unit homogeneity entails assuming that the observations used for the analysis 
are governed by the same data-generating process. For example, the transposition of Council 
and Commission (delegated) directives must be assumed to follow the same causal process if 
the sample includes both types of legislation. Similarly, when the analysis covers a longer time 
span, we need to assume that there are no fundamental changes in the way implementation 
works over time. Given the increasing attention to the problems of imperfect transposition 
and implementation of EU law since the 1990s this assumption might be problematic. Simply 
put, implementation of EU law during the 1970s might be a completely different ball game 
than implementation in the 2000s and researchers need to consider possible violations of the 
unit homogeneity assumption when they include different types of legislation and a long time 
span in the analysis. 
7
                                            
6 “Two units are homogeneous when the expected values of the dependent variables from each unit are the same 
when our explanatory variable takes on a particular value."   
. This assumption requires that there is (a) no selection bias, (b) no omitted 
variables bias, and (c) no endogeneity between the dependent and the independent variables. 
The quantitative literature on EU compliance is generally attentive to these requirements. 
Nevertheless, potential biases are sometimes overlooked. For example, the application of 
bivariate analyses is suspect to omitted variable problems given the highly correlated nature of 
many institutional and other state-related variables. A close reading of the literature can 
7 “Conditional independence is the assumption that values are assigned to explanatory variables independently of 
the values taken by the dependent variables”. Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 11 of 44 
uncover examples of possible violations of the endogeneity assumption and subtle selection 
biases. I will return to these problems when discussing conceptualizations and 
operationalizations of the dependent variables and the methods of analysis later in the text. 
This section highlighted the fact that compliance in the EU resembles a natural quasi- 
experiment allowing a window in the workings of different national politico-administrative 
systems as the main motivation behind research on EU transposition and implementation. It 
also concluded that statistical research is employed due to the great number of potential 
determinants of implementation performance and the complex nature of the interactions 
between these factors.  The literature on implementation is more ambitious than simply 
summarizing data and instead attempts to uncover causal relationships. This section 
introduced the two assumptions needed to make causal inferences from observational data – 
unit homogeneity and conditional independence. The next section of the paper will move to 
the in-depth review of the various elements of the quantitative analyses – dependent variables, 
domain of analysis, analytical techniques, and findings. I will commence with the discussion 
of the details of operationalization and measurement of compliance – the outcome analyzed 
in the reviewed literature.  
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3. DETECTING COMPLIANCE: OPERATIONALIZING AND MEASURING 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Almost all of the studies reviewed employ two types of data with regards to the dependent 
variable: the transposition of EU directives in the member states, and infringement 
procedures  against the member states for violations of EU law. The remaining analyses 
combine data from these two types into indexes of implementation performance or use 
reports by the Commission on implementation to operationalize compliance.  
Figure 1 presents a timeline of the transposition of a hypothetical directive with different 
events indicated on the line. Most studies have focused on the adoption of the first national 
transposition measure as the relevant event defining compliance. Some analyses attempt to 
define when ‘essentially’ correct transposition has taken place, and few focus on the last 
transposition measure (that is the last one at the time of conducting the research) adopted. 
Alternatively, studies of infringements focus on the moment a Letter of Formal Notice, a 
Reasoned Opinion, or an ECJ referral, is sent with regards to the transposition and 
implementation of the directive. 
 
Figure 1: The process of compliance with EU directives.  
Note: NIM- national implementing measures. 
 
Both transposition and infringement data provide only a partial perspective on 
compliance. The main disadvantage of transposition data is that it only refers to the formal-
legal part of the process. The main disadvantage of infringement data is that it is generated by 
strategic interactions between the Commission and the member states and is not a result of a 
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procedures can sometimes improve estimates of compliance levels8
Compliance is an irreducibly subjective (or ‘inter-subjective’) rather than an objective 
concept. Operationalizing and measuring compliance is not only imperfect because of 
measurement biases, insufficient information, etc. The judgment a researcher makes whether 
some member states have complied with a particular EU law is always open for criticism 
because there can be no objective standard of compliance that is applicable to all cases at all 
times. The fact that transposition and infringement data provide only partial perspectives on 
compliance has to be considered in this context. The shortcomings of transposition and 
infringement data should not be measured against some ‘perfectly’ objective measure because 
such a measure does not exist. 
. First, the start of an 
infringement procedure incorporates a qualitative assessment by the Commission on the 
adequacy of the notified national implementing acts in addition to the mere presence of any 
notified acts. Infringement procedures also reflect problems with the practical 
implementation of directives, so they give a glimpse beyond the formal-legal aspects of 
compliance. 
Following a strictly legalistic definition of compliance, as long as the European Court of 
Justice has not declared a certain national provision or practice in breach of EU law, we have 
to conclude that the provision or practice is compliant. Naturally, social scientists are not at 
ease with such a perspective because they know well that the process of detection, 
investigation and judgment of infringements is not infallible. At the same time, all 
interpretations of the compatibility or not of national provisions and practices with EU law 
cannot be separated from the actors who advance the interpretations.  Non-governmental 
                                            
8 Let us assume that we detect compliance either by (A) the absence of an infringement procedure, and (B) the 
presence of notified transposition measures. The indicator (A) will provide more valid estimates than indicator 
(B) if the Commission is more likely to (1) start an infringement procedure in case of notified measures but no 
real compliance than to (2) start an infringement procedure when there is compliance and notification. Situation 
(2) is not so implausible as it seems at first, if the member state complies, fails to notify right away, the 
Commission starts an infringement procedure, and only after that the member states notifies the transposition 
measure. The researcher looking back at the process will assess correctly the level of compliance by looking at the 
notified measures rather than by looking at the existence of an infringement procedure. Nevertheless, these cases 
should be few and far between since member states have an interest in reporting truthfully when they do comply. 
On the other hand, relying on infringement procedures can help us detect cases where a member state has not in 
fact complied but claims the contrary by submitting transposition measures (situation 1). These cases are quite 
probable given the incentive structure faced by member states. 
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organizations, government departments, the Commission, advocacy coalitions, trade unions, 
etc. are all actors with a specific stake in the process which influences their perspective and 
interpretation of the state of compliance. Thus, qualitative data cannot provide a golden 
standard against which to judge the failings of the data on transposition and infringements 
that quantitative work on compliance employs. We should, rather, inquire into the details and 
strategic setting of the processes that generate the data and attempt to counter any potential 
biases and threats to its validity. But there will always be room for subjectivity when deciding 
whether a certain national act or program implements sufficiently the EU directive or not. 
The concept of ‘essential’ compliance addresses precisely this tension but it also cannot escape 
the inherent subjectivity of compliance. 
Looking at the studies that employ transposition data we quickly note that they disagree 
about the proper way to operationalize transposition timeliness. While some studies take the 
first national transpositions measure adopted, others take the last transposition measure to 
signify compliance. Yet others construct a categorical variable and distinguish between levels 
of transposition delay. Given the discussion in the previous paragraphs, all we can say about 
the appropriateness of the different operationalizations is that they depend on the purpose of 
the researchers and that they all carry certain benefits and problems. Relying on the first 
transposition measure often underestimates the problems with compliance while relying on 
the last one can overestimate the transposition delay.   
In more technical terms, studies of transposition operationalize their dependent variable 
either as transposition time (the time between the adoption of the EU directive and some 
transposition measure), transposition delay (the time between the transposition deadline and 
the adoption of some transposition measure), transposition timeliness (a binary variable 
tracking whether transposition has been on time or not), or some categorical variable. 
Reviewing the literature, it seems that these choices have little impact on the conclusions of 
the study. Transposition time and delay are often highly correlated. Studies of the length of 
transposition delay that focus only on the delayed cases, however, suffer from selection bias. 
Unless the process that leads to some cases being delayed and others not is modeled, we 
should not accept at face value general conclusions about compliance reached by analyzing Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 15 of 44 
the length of delay based on data only on the cases that were delayed. Binary and categorical 
variables, by ignoring some of the information, are more conservative approaches that assume 
that the data is not reliable enough to allow us to treat transposition on a continuous scale, 
and that a delay of one week is substantively different from a delay of two years.  
Practically all studies focus on the temporal aspect of compliance (but see Franchino and 
Hoyland, 2009)9
Moving from operationalization and measurement to data source issues, we note that 
most of the transposition studies use the CELEX (EURLEX) database. This data source has 
been extensively and rightly criticized as insufficient and unreliable (Hartlapp and Falkner, 
2009). We have to recognize, however, that many of the actual analyses of transposition use 
CELEX (EURLEX) only as a first step in collecting the data and complement it with other 
national or EU-level databases. The main disadvantage of CELEX (EURLEX) is that it is 
essentially a database of transposition notifications and the researcher has to assume that the 
notifications present a close representation of the actual state of transposition. The database 
leaves the question whether an absence of notified measures signifies no need for notification 
(thus, full compliance), failure to notify the transposition measures, or a failure to adopt any 
transposition measures (thus complete non-compliance) (see König and Luetgert, 2009 for a 
detailed discussion). 
. All analyses focus on explaining the mean  of the distribution of the 
implementation outcomes. The variance of implementation performance – a variable that is 
interesting and important in its out right – is modeled only by Toshkov (2007a). 
 The situation has improved in recent years with some standardization in the 
requirements for reporting national data to EURLEX, but the problem remains. No doubt, 
combining data from different sources increases its validity and reliability but the disclaimer 
that there is no final, objective interpretation of compliance should be kept in mind. For 
example, the relevance of some acts reported in the context of transposition of a certain 
directive is often open for discussion.  
                                            
9 Using the data on transposition from EURLEX, Franchino and Hoyland (2009) present an analysis of the 
involvement of national parliaments in the transposition process.  This study is not included in the 
Implementation database, however, because the dependent variable is not compliance. Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 16 of 44 
The very real limitations of using transposition data have led many researchers to focus 
on infringements instead. Usually, some aggregation of the number of infringement cases 
against a country over a period of time is taken as the dependent variable. Since the 
infringement procedures are composed of several stages, scholars have the choice to focus 
either on the initial stages (Letter of Formal Notice and Reasoned Opinion) or on the actual 
judgments of the ECJ. Because individual data on infringements is not easily available, the 
bulk of the research resorts to aggregation. Aggregated data, however, may lead to serious 
problems for deriving proper estimates of the relationships between variables in the statistical 
models (e.g. due to auto-correlation from one year to the next). In addition to these ‘technical’ 
concerns we have to remember that the Commission is an actor with limited capacity and 
with specific institutional interests in the infringement process and that by focusing on the 
cases it chooses to pursue we might get a distorted picture of compliance in the EU. The 
infringement procedure is a game between the national authorities and the Commission, and 
the data generated by each move reflects strategic considerations and imperfect information. 
In addition, the data sources used to get information on the number of infringements resolved 
at different stages has its own shortcomings –  the number of letters of formal notice is 
inconsistently reported which might bias conclusions about the rate of resolution of certain 
types of cases, etc. 
In principle many of the issues raised above can be solved when individual-level data is 
available. However, we run into very serious problems with selection bias when we analyze 
individual-level infringement data if we focus only on the infringements. Data on which cases 
that led to a letter of formal notice also received an ECJ judgment is important in its own 
right, but it cannot be used to derive statements about compliance in general, because it only 
concerns cases that have been delayed or improperly implemented. Country rates of closing 
infringement cases are important but they cannot be taken as indications of country rates of 
compliance. A very simple example can demonstrate the point: the more cases you have at the 
early stages of the infringement procedure (e.g. because of delayed transposition), the more 
cases you will resolve before the ECJ judgment stage which will make you appear more Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 17 of 44 
compliant but only within the context of the infringement procedure and not in general, 
because you would still have more problematic cases at each stage of the procedure.  
In conclusion, quantitative analyses of compliance have relied on two types of data and a 
wide number of specific operationalizations of transposition timeliness and delay and 
infringement numbers and occurrence. Since all these operationalizations provide only a 
partial look at compliance, great care should be exercised in framing and interpreting the 
inferences of each individual study. By recording in detail the precise operationalizations of 
the dependent variables employed, the Implementation database makes this task easier. In 
addition to the dependent variables, the domain of the analysis can influence our conclusions 
about compliance. The next section of the paper turns to this aspect of the literature. 
 
 
   Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 18 of 44 
4. DEFINING THE DOMAIN OF ANALYSIS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE 
RESULTS 
Due to data collection limitations virtually no analysis covers all potential cases of 
compliance. The studies are distributed unevenly in terms of countries, policy sectors and 
time periods. Surprisingly, given its marginal place in the corpus of EU legislation, social 
policy receives the lion’s share of academic attention (a total of seven articles in the database 
focus exclusively on the social policy field). Because there is increasing evidence that 
compliance varies systematically across policy sectors (for a recent statement see Haverland et 
al., n.a.), focusing attention on only a few sectors and sidelining others can bias conclusions 
about compliance with EU law and policies in general.  
To date, there is only one study that looks at all 27 member states of the EU (Steunenberg 
and Toshkov, 2009). Most of the research has concentrated on the EU-15 (for the time before 
the Eastern enlargement but after the accession Sweden, Finland, and Austria). The choice of 
which specific countries to study is often made with regards to practical and data availability 
concerns which leads to some countries being overrepresented in the literature. Systematic 
differences in country transposition and implementation performance are also well 
established. What we know about compliance in Europe might be seriously influenced by the 
fact that we have studied some countries (Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK) more 
intensely than others. 
In aggregated data, the performance of some countries over time appears clustered but in 
specific datasets the clustering is rarely supported by formal analysis (Falkner et al., 2005, 
Thomson, 2007, Falkner, 2007, Thomson, 2009, Toshkov, 2007a, Falkner and Treib, 2008). 
Because cross-sector variation is at least as important as cross-country variation in compliance 
(see the discussion of multi-level models below) this fact should not come as a surprise. Also, 
grouping new versus old member states cannot be supported by the data (Steunenberg and 
Toshkov, 2009). 
The final observation about the domain of analysis is that most of the studies focus on all 
directives within a policy sector or a country and do not filter important from unimportant 
EU legislation. Although very well established, this decision can be criticized on the basis of Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 19 of 44 
the considerable variability of issues covered by the same legal instrument – the directive. By 
analyzing all directives we pool laws on rear-view mirrors of tractors together with laws on 
anti-discrimination. Furthermore, Commission directives as such are more similar to 
government resolutions in domestic legal systems while regular (Council and co-decision) 
directives resemble primary legislation. Hence, putting Commission and regular directives in 
the same analysis might lead to problems with the assumption of unit homogeneity. We will 
have more to say about this issue later in the paper when we discuss the findings, but it is 
important to emphasize that the lack of strong causal inferences in the literature can be 
attributed possibly to the fact that many different types of legislation, adopted under the 
heading of a ‘directive’, are pooled into the datasets. 
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5. ANALYZING THE DATA: THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
Moving from the domain of analysis to the discussion of the statistical methodology 
employed by the literature on compliance, two conclusions stand out: first, the statistical 
methods have become more sophisticated, and second survival analysis (and Cox 
proportional hazards) in particular is becoming the preferred way of analyzing transposition 
data. 
Unlike other subfields of political science and public administration, the study of EU 
implementation has largely avoided some common problems with statistical analysis of 
political data. For example, when analyzing counts of infringements or delayed transposition 
cases, scholars have relied on the negative binomial distribution which is more appropriate for 
rare events (and over-dispersed data) than the normal distribution. Moreover, many of the 
recent analyses are well-reported, pay attention to substantive and not only to statistical 
significance, illustrate their results, and test some of the assumptions of the models. The use of 
interaction effects, which allow for the test of more complex and subtle hypotheses, is 
increasingly common as well. 
Since the data on transposition is generated by observing a process over time, event 
history (survival) models are a natural choice for statistical analysis of the data. Initially 
parametric models were used (Mastenbroek, 2003), but more recently most scholars opt for 
the Cox proportional hazards version which makes fewer assumptions about the functional 
form of the baseline hazard of compliance.  
Regardless of whether count models or event history analysis are preferred, explicit 
consideration of the multi-level structure of the compliance data is crucial for deriving valid 
inferences. As indicated in the previous section, implementation performance differs across 
countries  and  across sectors (and possibly over time as well). The country and sector 
dummies included more or less incidentally in different analyses provide enough evidence for 
this argument. However, it is difficult to find a single statement in the entire literature on the 
amount of variation in implementation performance that can be attributed to the different 
levels of observation – countries, sectors, and individual directives. Using the dataset analyzed Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 21 of 44 
by Haverland et al. (n.d.), we can find that approximately the same amount of variation is 
present at the country level and at the sector level.  
Obviously, the transposition of two directives in the same policy field, and in the same 
country are not independent events as required by the assumptions of regression analysis. 
Many studies are aware of this problem and try to control for the multi-level structure of the 
data. Often, however, the fixes are only partial and address only one of the possible multi-level 
complications. Moreover, the most often employed method of ‘fixing’ the problem – using 
panel corrected standard errors – is not enough to address the problem. The estimates of the 
effects, and not only the estimates of the standard errors, might be seriously off the mark if the 
observations are not truly independent, and in the presence of clustering and serial 
correlation. In addition, the relationships between independent variables and dependent 
variables can change depending on the context (country, sector, etc.). Including country and 
sector dummies in the regression models (the ‘default’ strategy to address these 
complications) allows a different starting level (intercept) for the relationship in different 
settings, but the relationship itself (the slope) is not allowed to vary. It is technically possible 
and theoretically justified to examine whether the relationships suggested by the literature are 
consistent among different countries and sectors, and not only in the aggregate (on multilevel 
models see for example Gelman and Hill, 2007). 
Because of the increasing sophistication of the statistical techniques used to analyze 
compliance the findings also get more complex. While 10 years ago a statement like ‘EU 
approval is not related to transposition delay’ was typical, nowadays conclusions like ‘the 
effect of directive specialization on transposition time is negative during the first several weeks 
but gets positive and significant after this period’ are much more common. Interactions 
between explanatory variables, and interactions of the variables with time allow researchers to 
substantiate conclusions of increasing specificity which further leads us away from the search 
for broad generalizations about compliance in the EU (which might very well be futile).  
Whatever the differences in techniques and model specifications, practically all reviewed 
studies advance causal claims based on macro-level regressions. Given the problems with 
making causal inferences from observational data, the use of regression to substantiate causal Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 22 of 44 
relationships (see for example McKim and Turner, 1997, King et al., 1994) is insufficiently 
reflected upon in the literature. The paper already mentioned that, in addition to unit 
homogeneity, researchers have to consider selection bias, omitted variable bias, and 
endogeneity concerns. Random selection and random assignment of ‘treatment’ conditions in 
an experimental setting can ensure that the estimates of causal effects are not plagued by 
omitted variables and endogeneity. Random assignment of directives to different ‘treatments’ 
(causal variables), however, is impossible. The researcher has to make use of the natural 
variation occurring in the real world. If we compare two samples that differ in terms of a 
‘treatment’ (let’s say the novelty of a directive) we have to make sure that we control for all 
possible confounders (variables that are related both to the treatment and the outcome) in 
order to make a valid inference about the effect of the treatment (Gelman and Hill, 2007). In 
practice, the list of possible confounders is long and usually not known in advance (e.g. the 
length, author, decision rule, salience, specialization, technicality, and scope of a directive are 
potential confounding variables with respect to the novelty of a directive and its impact of 
compliance). Within a regression context we address this problem by including all these 
potential variables in the model. We cannot ensure however that our two samples (treatment 
and no treatment, new and old directives) will be balanced even if we can assume that we have 
identified and measured all potential confounders. Maybe all our new directives happen to be 
overwhelmingly also Council directives adopted under unanimity while all old directives with 
very few exceptions are co-decision directives adopted under qualified-majority voting. 
Adjusting for the confounding influence of author and voting rule will be impossible, and we 
might not even notice the imbalance because the statistical software will still produce 
coefficients for all these variables (except in the rare cases of perfect colinearity). This 
situation is very likely when we include many country-level variables and must rely on only a 
small selection of countries (usually less than 15) in order to derive estimates of the effects of 
these country-level variables. 
Matching is a procedure that can help alleviate these problems by reorganizing and 
restricting the original samples in order to achieve a better balance between treatment and 
control groups (Ho et al., 2007, Gelman and Hill, 2007). Matching ensures explicitly that each Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 23 of 44 
observation in the ‘treatment’ group is matched with an observation in the control group that 
is as similar as possible with regard to all possible important characteristics. Observations that 
do not fit are discarded. By using only the relevant information in the dataset, matching 
avoids some of the traps in making causal inferences from observational data but it has not 
been, so far, used in the literature on EU implementation. Different forms of matching have 
high potential for improving the methodological foundations of the field but they require that 
researchers refrain from macro-level regressions that provide estimates of dozens of ‘causal’ 
effects at a time, but rather focus on specific hypotheses and evaluate them with due care to 
the assumptions for making causal inferences. 
Multi-level modeling and matching are two directions for methodological innovation in 
the field of compliance studies that can also help account for, and move beyond, the rather 
contradictory nature of findings. As the following section will make clear, few of the causal 
inferences suggested at one time or another in the literature have been consistently supported 
and confirmed. More often, estimated relationships cover the full spectrum from positive to 
negative depending on the exact dependent variable, scope, and method used. 
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6. TAKING STOCK: WHAT AFFECTS COMPLIANCE? 
No less than 263 relationships between potential explanatory factors and some aspect of 
compliance have been tested in the articles reviewed in this paper and the accompanying 
database. In order to ease comparison of this enormous number of findings, the database on 
which this paper is based classifies the independent variables according to their level (EU, 
national) and the broad type or category that the variables falls into (e.g. institution, culture, 
etc.). While fallible, the process of categorization allows for taking stock of the findings of the 
literature. In this part of the paper, I will go through some of the types of variables recorded in 
the database. I will summarize the findings by indicating how many of the analyses report a 
significant negative (positive), a non-significant negative (positive) and no relationship10
6.1. Institutions 
, 
separately for studies which use transposition, implementation, and combined index data. 
Where possible, I will suggest scope restrictions or domain limitations that can makes sense of 
the contradictions. 
Many institutional features of the European states have been probed as possible 
explanations of compliance. An incomplete list includes federalism, regionalism, corporatism, 
meso-level institutions like co-ordination strength of the executive, extent of parliamentary 
scrutiny on EU affairs, etc. 
The impact of federalism/regionalism on compliance seems rather well-established. We 
can say quite confidently that the impact is not positive. Approximately half of the studies 
report a significantly negative relationship (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007, König and 
Luetgert, 2009, Thomson, 2007, Linos, 2007), the remaining ones agree that there is a negative 
relationship but cannot find statistical significance (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009, Giuliani, 
2003, Mbaye, 2001, Jensen, 2007). 
                                            
10  Some readers might be disturbed by the fact that non-significant relationships are not reported as ‘no 
relationships’. However, statistical significance and substantive significance are not the same. Especially in small 
samples, the lack of statistical significance might obscure a substantively important relationship. That is why only 
effects that are zero for all practical purposes have been reported in the ‘no effect category’. Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 25 of 44 
The effect of corporatism has received much attention but the findings are inconclusive. 
A positive effect is discovered by König and Luetgert (2009) and a positive but not significant 
one is found by Kaeding (2006) and Thomson (2007), while Lampinen and Uusikyla (1998) 
and Mbaye (2001) find a non-significant negative relationship.  
 
Table 1: Federalism and regionalism 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  5  3  0  0  0 
Infringements  0  1  1  0  0 
 
 
Table 2: Corporatism 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  0  1  0  2  1 
Infringements  0  1  0  0  0 
 
 
Table 3: Parliamentary scrutiny 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  0  0  0  1  2 
Index  0  0  0  0  2 
 
 
The extent of parliamentary scrutiny is positive and significantly related to compliance. 
Evidence for this link is brought by Bergman (2000), Giuliani (2004) and Linos (2007). Linos 
in fact finds a significant effect on the length of transposition delay but not on the occurrence 
of delay (transposition timeliness). Parliamentary involvement (measured not as an 
institutional characteristic but as the share of primary legislation in the transposition acts) is 
beneficial also according to König and Luetgert (2009). 
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6.2. Veto players 
The concept of veto players plays a prominent place in research on Europeanization, and 
compliance with EU law more specifically. Although related to federalism, it is more dynamic 
than an institution as, depending on the precise operationalization, its values change with the 
number of parties in government, type of Parliamentary procedure, etc. In fact, it combines 
institutional and preference information in order to provide an index of the capability and 
capacity of the politico-administrative system to change laws and policies.  
The literature strongly suggests that the impact of veto players is not positive, and most 
likely it is negative. Significant relationships are reported by Kaeding (2006, 2008a) Linos 
(2007) and Giuliani (2003). Weaker  but still non-positive relationships are found by Jensen 
(2007),  Toshkov (2007b),  Mbaye (2001)  and  Kaeding (2006)  with a different 
operationalization.  Steunenberg and Kaeding (2009) qualify these findings by reporting an 
effect that starts positive but turns negative with the passage of time. 
The closely related index of political constraints has negative and significant impact 
according to Perkins and Neumayer (2007), no impact according to Börzel et al. (2007) and 
positive and significant impact according to Hille and Knill (2006)  who work with data on the 
candidate member states only. Government type (minority or not) has no effect (Bergman 
2000), but Giuliani (2003) insists that the effective number of parties has a positive and 
significant effect. The number of parties in government has a negative and significant effect 
according to Toshkov (2007a, 2008).  
Some of the less often tested institutional hypotheses concern policy centralization (no 
effect – Siegel 2006), executive control of the legislature (positive effect according to Giuliani 
2003 but negative according to Siegel 2006), EU co-ordination strength (negative effect – 
Giuliani, 2004), oversight type (Jensen 2007), and consensualism (negative effect– Giuliani 
2003). 
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6.3. Capacity 
Next to institutions, variables capturing in one way or another government capacity and 
quality are analyzed by many of the works reviewed. There is rather strong evidence that 
government quality influences positively compliance (Berglund et al., 2006, Börzel et al., 2007, 
Haverland and Romeijn, 2007,  Hille and Knill, 2006,  Lampinen and Uusikyla, 1998, 
Linos, 2007,  Mbaye, 2001,  Toshkov, 2007a,  Toshkov, 2008,  Siegel, 2006). The few 
aberrations are Thomson (2007),  Perkins and Neumayer (2007), and Steunenberg and 
Toshkov (2009) (the latter work with a special sample of legislation and include the new 
member states in the analysis). 
The picture is confirmed by studies who track the influence of levels of corruption on 
compliance and find a negative effect (Linos, 2007, Kaeding, 2006). The  opposite conclusion 
by Mbaye (2001) might be driven by colinearity problems. 
 
 
Table 4: Veto players 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  5  1  1  0  0 
Infringements  0  1  1  0  0 





Table 5: Political constraints 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Infringements  1  0  1  0  0 
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Table 6: Administrative efficiency 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  0  1  1  0  8 
Infringements  1  0  1  0  3 




Table 7: Corruption index 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  3  0  0  0  0 
Infringements  0  0  0  1  0 
 
 
Different aspects of co-ordination capacity have been tested with the general conclusion 
that they have a significantly positive effect on compliance while the involvement of more 
than one ministry influences negatively transposition time (Mastenbroek, 2003, Haverland 
and Romeijn, 2007, Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009) (see also the discussion of institutions). 
More distant proxies of state power and capacity exhibit no effects. GDP and GDP per 
capita  (Börzel et al., 2007), state financial capabilities (Hille and Knill, 2006)  and fiscal 
resources (Mbaye, 2001) are not associated with compliance. Comparative economic power is 
negatively related (Mbaye, 2001). All in all, bureaucratic quality improves compliance but 
more general measures of state capabilities show no effect.  
 
6.4. Preferences 
The third major group of explanations refers to preferences and attitudes. There are 
numerous hypotheses advanced in the literature that try to capture the intuition that member 
states which have a stronger preferences the EU policies to be ‘downloaded’ will comply faster 
than states that oppose them. Many different proxies of state preferences have been tested: 
some of them refer to the attitudes of the public at large, other to government preferences. Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 29 of 44 
Some studies employ general EU or ideological preferences while others try to measure 
preferences with regard to individual policy sectors, or pieces of legislation. Altogether the 
findings are rather inconclusive.  
Let us start first with state power – a factor that is not directly related to preferences but 
which is a proxy for the ability of member states to shape the EU legislation to their liking. 
The findings with regards to the effect of state power are rather polarized. Mbaye (2001), 
Jensen (2007) and Perkins and Neumayer (2007) find evidence for a positive and significant 
effect. On the other hand, Giuliani (2003),  Siegel (2006)  and  Börzel et al. (2007)  find a 
significant negative effect. The conflicting findings are even harder to explain given the 
relatively straight-forward operationalization of state power as some function of the number 
of votes in the Council of Ministers. Using an alternative measure – logged population - 
Perkins and Neumayer (2007) find no effect. 
Moving from state power to societal EU attitudes, the conclusion is more straightforward 
– a more EU supportive public does not lead to a more compliant government. Significant 
negative effects are uncovered by  Mbaye (2001)  and  Bergman (2000)  while most of the 
studies find no significant relationship - Siegel (2006), Kaeding (2006), Börzel et al. (2007) and 
Lampinen and Uusikyla (1998). The only study that finds a significant positive effect is based 
on data on the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Toshkov 2009). Hence, 
the conclusion that a society which harbors greater support for the EU does not lead to faster 
transposition and fewer infringements can be qualified: during Enlargement periods the 
candidate countries are sensitive to societal EU support and adapt faster to the EU 
requirements when support is higher. 
 
Table 8: Bargaining power 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Infringements  2  0  1  0  3 
Index  1  0  0  0  0 
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Table 9: Societal EU attitude 
  
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  0  1  1  0  1 
Infringements  1  0  2  0  0 




Table 10: Government EU position 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  0  1  0  1  2 
Infringements  0  0  0  1  0 




Table 11: Government Left/Right position 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  0  3  0  1  1 
Infringements  0  0  1  1  0 
 
 
In addition to societal attitudes, scholars have also tested the impact of government 
ideological positions on compliance. While government affinity to the EU (measured usually 
with the help of expert surveys) seems positively related to compliance, left-right positions do 
not matter. All studies that do find a significant relationship between governmental EU 
positions and compliance are based on data from the period of Enlargement. Similarly, the 
only significant effect of left right ideological positions is again found in the context of EU 
accession (Toshkov, 2008). The remaining articles which analyze the relationship between 
socio-economic left/right positions and compliance do not report a significant effect (Jensen, 
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More specific indicators of government preferences also demonstrate limited explanatory 
capacity. For example, Toshkov (2007b)  finds a significant positive effect of government 
positions on EU social policy on the adaptation success of the candidate countries from CEE 
in the field of social policy. But using directive-level data Thomson (2007) concludes that 
there is no relationship between a country’s disagreement with a directive and compliance. 
With the help of expert-survey derived preference data on individual directives, Thomson et 
al. (2007) find a significant positive relationship between a country’s incentive to deviate and 
compliance with infringement procedures but a negative relationship with transposition 
delay. Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied (2009) report no effect for the same independent variable 
and transposition delay. Linos (2007) reports a negative, but non-significant effect of a 
country voting against a directive on the length of transposition delay and on transposition 
timeliness for the social policy sector. 
 
Table 12: Disagreement with the directive 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  1  2  2  0  0 




Table 13: EU-level conflict 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 




Table 14: Misfit 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  4  0  0  2  1 
Infringements  1  0  0  0  0 
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Next to country and directive level preferences and positions, some scholars use indirect 
proxies to capture the incentives a country has to comply with EU law. Most articles find no 
significant relationship, however. König and Luetgert (2009) report a non-significant negative 
effect of the domestic value-added share of the sector. Perkins and Neumayer (2007) find a 
positive and significant effect of intra-EU trade, but Siegel (2006) concludes that the same 
effect is negative and not significant. Unemployment levels are not related to compliance in 
the social policy sector (Linos 2007, Toshkov 2007b), neither are labour costs (Linos 2007). 
Surprisingly, net transfers from the EU have a negative and significant effect on compliance 
according to Perkins and Neumayer (2007) and König and Luetgert (2009). 
6.5. Conflict: EU level and national level 
Another way to account for the variation in transposition performance that is related to 
preferences is to examine the effect of conflict. Conflict at the EU level when adopting the 
directive and conflict at the national level when transposing the directive have been 
hypothesized to exert an influence on the implementation patterns. With regards to EU level 
conflict, Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied (2009) find a complex effect which starts at zero but 
turns positive with the passage of time (using heterogeneity and policy polarization as 
measures). König and Luetgert (2009) and Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009) however argue for a 
strongly negative and significant effect of the size of the EU core  
The exploration of domestic-level conflict brings us back to the discussion of veto players 
because essentially both institutional and preference-based arguments try to capture the idea 
that the more disagreement (and the more institutionalized opportunities for disagreement) 
you have at the national level, the more cumbersome compliance will be. The findings about 
the impact of domestic preference heterogeneity are relatively strong.  König and Luetgert 
(2009)  and  Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009)  discover a significantly negative relationship. 
Toshkov (2008) reports no effects for the ideological distance between governing parties on 
both the EU and the left right dimensions, but a negative and significant effect for the number 
of parties in government (which is a more indirect proxy for conflict).  
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6.6. Misfit 
The hypothesis that countries will deter compliance when they do not like the legislation 
they are about to implement (or ‘download’) is closely related to the expectation that when 
that the more the EU and the national policy differ, the more difficult the adaptation to the 
EU rules. This so-called misfit hypothesis is a central plank of studies of Europeanization and 
occupies a central place in quantitative studies of implementation with EU directives as well. 
The findings are relatively straightforward. Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009), Mastenbroek 
(2003), Thomson et al. (2007) and Thomson (2007) report a significant negative relationship 
while Linos (2007) and Kaeding (2006) find positive although not significant effect (the 
exception is one of the two analyses that Linos presents in which the effect is positive and 
significant). 
6.7. Directive-level features 
Most of the variables discussed so far capture differences between states and within states 
over time. A significant amount of effort has been directed into analyzing the impact of 
certain features of a directive on its chances for timely and proper implementation. Although 
causal interpretations are often endorsed for these effects, it is actually quite hard to see how 
the differences in compliance likelihood between different types of directives can be 
interpreted as causal. For example, even if we find that Commission directives have a higher 
chance of being transposed on time, do we believe that if the same subject matter was to be 
adopted by the Council rather than by the Commission, compliance would have been 
different? It seems very hard to disentangle the reasons that make one directive more likely to 
be adopted by the Commission rather than by the Council (or new vs. amending, or adopted 
under unanimity vs. qualified majority voting) from the reasons that affect compliance with 
the directive. Especially using multivariate regression where the researchers hopes to control 
for all these different reasons by including many possible confounders in the model, 
interpreting differences as causal effects seems problematic.  
The findings from the existing literature about the relationships between features of the 
directives and compliance, be they causal or not, are inconclusive. Beginning with discretion – Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 34 of 44 
the amount of leeway contained in the text of a directive – and its impact on compliance we 
can immediately see that scholars disagree. While Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009), Kaeding 
(2008a) and Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied (2009) report a significant negative effect, Thomson 
et al. (2007) and Thomson (2007) find a positive one. It should be noted that on a theoretical 
level, the hypothesized impact of discretion also oscillates from negative to positive. 
 
Table 15: Discretion 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  3  0  0  1  1 




Table 16: Voting rule 
 
  Negative 
(significant)  Negative  ~ Zero  Positive  Positive 
(significant) 
Transposition  1  0  1  1  1 
Infringements  0  1  0  0  0 
 
 
Different concepts like complexity and salience have been operationalized and tested 
using the number of recitals of a directive as a measure. Kaeding (2006) finds a positive effect 
in the transport sector while Haverland and Romeijn (2007) and Toshkov (2008) report no 
significant effect for the social policy sector and the new member states respectively. The 
variable  political sensitivity  which is a factor positively related to the number of recitals, 
amongst others, is negatively related to transposition success according to Steunenberg and 
Kaeding (2009). 
The novelty of directives (new vs. amending) appears to be related equally inconsistently 
with compliance. Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009)  and  Kaeding (2006)  discover significant 
negative effects, while Haverland and Romeijn (2007)  and  Mastenbroek (2003)  find no 
significant effects at all. The voting rule according to which a directive has been adopted has a 
very inconsistent impact as well, according to the literature as can be seen from Table 16. Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 35 of 44 
The studies seem to agree that Commission directives (delegated legislation) are more 
likely to be complied with (Luetgert and Dannwolf, 2009, Mastenbroek, 2003), or at least they 
are not less likely (König and Luetgert, 2009, Kaeding, 2006), apart from transposition in the 
context of Enlargement negotiations when the effect is negative and significant (Toshkov 
2008). Furthermore, Steunenberg and Kaeding (2009) find no effect for their specialization 
variable which is a factor score positively related to the number of annexes and shorter 
transposition deadlines of directives.  
6.8. Summary  
Summarizing the review of the findings so far, we can make a crude classification of the 
variables for which evidence for a relationship with compliance is strong and relatively 
univocal, those for which the findings are not very consistent but the exceptions can be 
accounted for relatively easily, and finally those variables for which the literature disagrees 
whether they do have an effect, and what the direction of the influence is. 
The variables that we are almost certain affect compliance positively (or at least not 
negatively) are: 
(1) administrative efficiency,  
(2) parliamentary scrutiny, and  
(3) coordination strength.  
The variables that exert a negative (or at least a non-positive) influence are: 
(4) federalism/regionalism,  
(5) corruption levels,  
(6) veto players,  
(7) number of ministries involved, and  
(8) domestic conflict. 
We can be quite certain that (9) general economic indicators are not related to 
compliance as are (10) very general (economic) proxies for country preferences. 
Societal (1) and (2) governmental EU attitudes and to some extent (3) governmental 
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periods but either have the opposite effect (possibly societal EU support) or no effect 
(government EU support and left/right positions) otherwise. The generally positive effect of 
(4) Commission directives on compliance is also reversed for candidate countries. We can 
also add (5) misfit to this group as it seems to work in the general case but not in the transport 
and social policy fields  
The evidence for the following variables is so mixed that we can hardly conclude anything 
about their impact:  
(1) corporatism,   
(2) political constraints,  
(3) type of government and number of parties in government,  
(4) bargaining power,  
(5) country disagreement with a directive,  
(6) EU level conflict, 
 (7) discretion, and  
(8) directive voting rule. 
This overview zooms in only on variables that have been analyzed by several studies. Of 
course, relationships that have been examined only once appear to have more consistent 
effects (this is not to say that these effects cannot prove to be strong and replicable).  
6.9. Possibilities to extend the analysis 
Many other relationships have been tested in the literature. Different aspects of national 
political culture, features of the national transposition measures, learning, etc. have all been 
analyzed at one time or another. The review of the findings of the quantitative literature on 
compliance can be extended further. The database keeps records on many other types of 
variables. The full list of categories is available on the website of the database. The database 
contains additionally information about the size of the estimated effects (where available) and 
details on the operationalizations of the variables so as to enhance replicability of the analyses. 
The review presented above is sufficient to demonstrate, however, the opportunities that the Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 37 of 44 
database offers for summarizing, assessing, and discussing the state of the art of statistical 
research on the transposition and implementation of EU law. 
The review also makes clear that very few of the findings are corroborated by all studies in 
all settings (sectors, countries, and time periods). In fact, some of the findings that receive 
strong support are that directive features matter for compliance. Therefore restricting the 
analysis to only a subset of all EU directives and using even more interaction effects (and 
higher order interaction effects) can address the heterogeneity of the population (the EU 
directives) and account for the puzzle of conflicting findings. The use of interaction effects is 
gaining prominence in the literature (e.g. Steunenberg and Kaeding, 2009, Zhelyazkova and 
Torenvlied, 2009, Luetgert and Dannwolf, 2009, Toshkov, 2008,  Thomson et al., 2007) but 
can receive even wider application. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS: WHY SO MUCH INCONSISTENCY? 
Many of the findings reviewed above are inconsistent and not supported by different 
analyses. Given that the studies focus on different aspects of compliance (transposition, 
implementation), have varying domains (in terms of countries, sectors, and time periods), use 
different statistical techniques and model specifications, and employ different sets of 
independent variables (operationalized and measured differently) the disagreements in the 
literature are not that surprising. One way to deal with the inconsistency is to accept that our 
findings will be very different depending on whether, for example, we use the first or the last 
transposition measure reported, or we count letters of formal notice instead of reasoned 
opinions, etc. More appropriate operationalizations and more reliable data can certainly help 
in this regard. It should be noted, however, that some research design problems, like the 
choice of a dependent variable, cannot be objectively ‘solved’ and will always have a degree of 
subjectivity. 
The fact that the estimated effects are so sensitive to these research design decisions is 
another argument in favor of changing the strategy from macro-level regressions estimating 
numerous effects simultaneously to matching procedures focusing on distilling the effect of 
one, or a small number of variables, at a time. Many of the country-level variables analyzed by 
the literature have very limited (if at all) variation over time and the number of cross-sectional 
units is also small (up to 27, but most often less than 15). Estimating simultaneously a number 
of country-level variables in this setting leads to a situation in which the statistical model has 
to extrapolate the data a lot in order to create the relevant ‘counterfactual’ for estimating the 
effects. For example, if most of the countries in our sample have a high number of veto players 
and negative public EU attitude while the others have a low number of veto players and 
positive EU attitude, and if we try to get estimates for the effect of both veto players and EU 
attitude variables, the numbers that the statistical software will produce would not mean 
much. Matching can improve on the situation by selecting only observations that bring 
relevant data. 
In addition, we might have to accept that our findings have a very confined domain of 
application and conclusions reached on the basis of analyzing social policy cannot be Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 39 of 44 
extended to other policy areas, for example. The plea for more attention to the multi-level 
structure of the data, expressed earlier in the paper, will recognize these limitations and might 
help to make sense of the data better than existing approaches. It might very well be that the 
relationships between different institutional, preference-based, cultural, enforcement, etc. 
factors and compliance on the other hand are real and waiting to be discovered, but that their 
complexity and ever-changing nature makes the task very difficult. The trend towards using 
more interaction effects can complement full-fledged multi-level modeling to address these 
challenges. 
Next, we should be able to recognize the possibility that there might be just little to 
discover  and that compliance in the EU might not reveal many systematic relationships. 
Similarly, even if the relationships are present, they might be so weak that the ‘signal to noise’ 
ratio prohibits us from estimating effects with any reasonable precision. The success of the 
literature to identify at least several relatively consistent relationships and the persistence of 
systematic variance between (some) countries and across (some) sectors indicates otherwise, 
but the possibility that there is not much to discover is always present.  
Finally, in order to identify important relationships we need larger datasets and for that 
we need many observations covering extended periods of time. We have to assume, however, 
that the structure of the compliance process remain the same over time. In fact, there are 
many reasons to believe that the process of compliance changes drastically. It is also quite 
likely that all the attention of the academic community to compliance in the EU itself 
contributes to the transformation of the process. In fact, the 33rd
As the literature review has made apparent, the academic study of implementation in the 
EU based on quantitative methods is a growing and lively field that has offered a number of 
important conclusions. First, it has uncovered several robust associations between compliance 
and administrative efficiency and types of directives, for example. Somewhat accidentally, it 
has also demonstrated that many variables have only complex (time-dependent), contingent 
 study of compliance will 
analyze a process that has fundamentally different institutional setting, salience, actors 
involved, etc. than the first one. The object of research ‘reacts’ to the ‘scientific’ attention and 
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(dependent on the values of other variables) and domain-restricted (valid only for certain 
countries, sectors, or time periods) effects. There is visible progress in the methodological 
sophistication and increasing reporting standards of the literature. Several challenges, 
however, remain. 
First of all, the combined results from all studies indicate that maybe a theory and a 
model of compliance with all EU directives is not possible. Simply, the body of EU legislation 
is too heterogeneous to allow such a single theory and statistical model. How and when to 
filter for certain aspects of the directives is an open question, but it is likely that there will be 
no single explanation that can account simultaneously for the implementation of legislation 
on the size of rear-view tractor mirrors and for the implementation of legislation on the 
freedom to provide services in the internal market. 
Second, the multi-level structure of the data has not been modeled explicitly and 
comprehensively. We could be missing important effects because they have different direction 
in different settings (e.g. countries) or we could be generalizing some relationship that holds 
strongly only in one sector for example, to the entire body of EU law. Even a simple statement 
about the amount of variation that can be attributed to the different levels of the data is 
missing from the literature at the moment. 
Finally, methodological sophistication can only lead us a certain way towards progress in 
this academic field. The key for better empirical findings lies with better theorizing  of 
compliance in the EU. Linking the institutional, preference, and capacity-related domestic 
variables with the strategic interactions between the Commission and the member states in 
the context of the EU enforcement procedure is a pressing need. Zooming in at an even 
greater level at the process of national adaption to the EU requirements provides another 
avenue for progress. Many of the hypotheses suggested by the literature can be more fruitfully 
tested if more detailed data on the process of implementation is available. For example, for 
now hypotheses about the effect of executive co-ordination are tested on data recording the 
time until the final adoption of national transposition measures (which often includes time 
spent for parliamentary discussions, presidential vetoes, infringement challenges, etc.). If data 
on the time until the drafting of the bill at the government were available, that would allow a Working Paper No: 01/2010    Page 41 of 44 
much better test of the effect of executive co-ordination. Similarly, hypotheses about the 
impact of the veto players cannot be efficiently tested on data that includes many cases which 
do not even require the agreement of these ‘veto’ players. 
In conclusion, using the Implementation database, which is going to be regularly 
updated, the field of EU compliance studies can better assess its contributions and 
shortcomings. Future research on EU compliance and implementation will have the benefit of 
easy access to and comparison of existing studies, a quick reference to operationalization 
details, and, hopefully, a source of inspiration. 
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